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Clarett v. National Football League:  Defining the Non-
Statutory Labor Exception to Antitrust Law as it pertains 
to Restraints primarily focused in Labor Markets and 
Restraints primarily focused in Business Markets  
RONALD TERK SIA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal antitrust law and national labor law set forth two conflicting 
policies that have created a periodic drama for sports fans concerned that 
their favorite sports will suffer a cataclysmic court room battle impairing 
the quality of the game.1  The Supreme Court interpreted federal antitrust 
and labor law to implicitly exclude antitrust liability for certain collective 
bargaining labor related activities under the non-statutory labor exception 
to antitrust law.2  This absence of explicit guidance has led to a split in the 
circuits where courts have formulated their own interpretations of these 
colliding national policies.  In 1996, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Pro 
Football, Inc., 3 attempted to further clarify the scope of this exemption and 
ultimately held that national antitrust and labor policies favored the appli-
cation of the exception when the alleged restraints were in labor markets 
defined by collective bargaining.  In 2004, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held in Clarett v. National Football League4 
that Brown reaffirmed the Second Circuit position that restraints resulting 
from the collective bargaining process and primarily impacting the labor 
market were subject to the non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law. 
In 2003, Maurice Clarett, a sophomore collegiate running back for 
Ohio State University (“OSU”) announced that he intended to enter the 
  
 * JD Candidate, 2006, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, N.H.; B.S., Chemical Engineering, 
2000, Tufts University, Medford, Mass.  I would like to thank the Pierce Law Review Board and Edito-
rial Staff for their assistance and helpful comments in putting this article together.  I would also like to 
thank Jeffrey Roy, Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center, Pierce Law Review Faculty Advisor, 
and Peter Foley, Adjunct Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center, for their learned guidance and 
thoughtful suggestions. 
 1. See e.g. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 233-34 (1996). 
 2. Id. (noting that earlier decisions by the same court set forth this exception, but declined to set 
forth a clear bright line rule by which to apply the exemption). 
 3. 518 U.S. at 250 (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption applied beyond impasse and 
until the collective bargaining process was terminated or completed but declining to explicitly state 
how that is triggered). 
 4. 369 F.3d 124, 130-31, 135 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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2004 National Football League (“NFL”) draft.  The NFL declared that 
Clarett was ineligible for the rookie draft stating that the NFL player Eligi-
bility Rules required all players to have exceeded a three year post-high 
school graduation requirement.  Clarett subsequently sued the NFL, claim-
ing that the Eligibility Rules worked as a violation of antitrust law by un-
reasonably restraining him from pursuing a career in the NFL.5  
The National Football League Management Committee (“NFLMC”) 
and the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) are con-
tractually obligated to the terms and conditions of the current collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”).6  The CBA references the NFL Constitu-
tion and Bylaws, which requires all draft applicants to meet a minimum of 
having exhausted at least three football seasons after their high school 
graduation (the “Eligibility Rules”).7  Clarett’s case went to trial in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, result-
ing in a finding of an antitrust violation and an injunction ordering the NFL 
to instate Clarett for the draft.8   
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the district court 
holding that the Eligibility Rules violated antitrust law.9  Notably, the court 
interpreted the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law to require 
deference to the labor law remedies and policy where the alleged injury is 
primarily focused in a labor market.10  
Clarett’s desire to enter professional organized labor is indicative of 
the ongoing desire by many younger athletes to forego formal post-
secondary education and to enter the world of professional sports.11  Over 
the past several decades, there has been a general relaxing of age-based 
player eligibility rules in many professional sports (including the 1993 
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, a move from a four year post-high 
school requirement to the current three year requirement).12  Commentators 
  
 5. Id. at 129. 
 6. Id. at 126-27. 
 7. Id. at 128. 
 8. Clarett v. National Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 9. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143. 
 10. Id. at 142-43. 
 11. See infra pt. II(A) and accompanying text (briefly discussing the increasing success of younger 
rookies becoming all-star athletes in various professional sports for example, the NBA drafts of high 
school players including Kobe Bryant and LeBron James). 
 12. See generally Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204-05, 1207 (1971) (finding that NBA eligi-
bility rule as a per se violation of antitrust law); Robert D. Koch, 4th and Goal:  Maurice Clarett Tack-
les the NFL Eligibility Rule, 24 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 291, 294 (2004) (discussing NFL eligibility rules 
going from a four year to three year requirement); Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. MacKinnon, 
Professional Football’s Draft Eligibility Rule:  The Labor Exception and the Antitrust Laws, 33 Emory 
L.J. 375, 376-77 (1984) (analyzing the now dissolved U.S. Football League’s signing of Herschel 
Walker in 1983, as an exception to its own eligibility rules). 
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continue to opine that the NFL Eligibility Rules should be abolished.13  
Had this happened, Clarett would have likely entered the NFL in the 2004 
draft and not spent over a year away from organized football; instead 
Clarett remained depressed by the Second Circuit decision and prepared 
himself for the 2005 draft.14  Still, the policies behind the national antitrust 
and labor laws have set forth principles which have been interpreted by the 
courts to exempt certain labor issues from federal antitrust law.   
Clarett noted the distinction between its own circuit law (as supported 
by the 1996 Brown decision) which interpreted labor laws as “waiv[ing] 
antitrust liability for restraints on competition imposed through the collec-
tive bargaining process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a 
labor market characterized by collective bargaining” and differing interpre-
tations as set forth by Eighth Circuit law.”15  Clarett noted the distinction 
between its own circuit law (as supported by the 1996 Brown decision) and 
differing interpretations as set forth by the Eighth Circuit.16  Clarett held 
that the Eligibility Rules were a mandatory subject of bargaining and a 
restraint created by the collective bargaining agreement; the court further 
found that this restraint operated primarily in a labor market, not a business 
market.17  Accordingly, Clarett interpreted national antitrust and labor pol-
icy to dictate that the issue was exempt from antitrust violation and under 
the jurisdiction of labor law and the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”).18 
This note will analyze the Second Circuit’s ruling and rationale in light 
of the relevant governing law and national policies between antitrust law 
and labor law.  Part II will discuss the general trend of player-raised anti-
trust challenges to restraint cases in professional sports, setting the stage 
for an aspiring football player like Clarett to challenge the NFL Eligibility 
Rules.  In Part III, this note will discuss the facts, procedural history and 
outcome of Clarett.  Part IV will discuss the historical background under 
  
 13. See Shuana Itri, Maurice Clarett v. National Football League, Inc.: An Analysis of Clarett’s 
Challenge to the Legality of the NFL’s Draft Eligibility Rule Under Antitrust Law, 11 Vill. Sports & 
Ent. L.J. 303, 304 (2004); Koch, supra n. 12, at 347-48. 
 14. See e.g. Tom Friend & Ryan Hockensmith, Clarett claims cash, cars among benefits, ESPN, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1919059 (Nov. 9, 2004, 5:51 p.m. EDT) (discussing 
Clarett’s status a year following the Second Circuit ruling); Andrew Mason, Final Pick, Fresh Start:  
Shanahan gives Clarett “Clean State” after Selection, http://www.denverbroncos.com/page.php?id= 
334&storyID=4094 (April 23, 2005) (discussing the two years Clarett spent away from organized 
football and his potential as the Denver Bronco’s notorious 101st 2005 Draft Pick). 
 15. 369 F.3d at 137-38 (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 235). 
 16. Id. at 134 (declining to follow the law set forth in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) 
as this case had not been adopted by the Supreme Court, or earlier Second Circuit cases); see infra pt. 
VI and accompanying text (discussing Clarett’s recognition of binding precedent set forth by the Su-
preme Court and relevant Second Circuit law). 
 17. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139, 141. 
 18. Id. at 134, 139-41. 
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which Clarett was ruled.  Part V will analyze how courts have distin-
guished between restraints created through the collective bargaining proc-
ess which primarily impact the labor market as opposed to those that pri-
marily impact business markets.  In Part VI, this note will analyze Clarett’s 
interpretation of Brown in distinguishing labor and business markets, and 
discuss how the non-statutory labor exception should be applied to labor 
market restraints as compared to business market restraints.  Finally, it will 
outline the legacy that Clarett provides for future player-raised challenges 
in similar situations. 
II. HISTORY REGARDING PLAYER ELIGIBILITY RULES 
Contemporary sports have seen an influx of young talent opting for a 
chance at playing in the big leagues earlier at the expense of obtaining 
higher education.19  Many dream of playing professional sports—dreams 
often prohibited by player eligibility rules.  In situations where the 
restraints are not argued to have been protected by non-statutory labor 
exception, antitrust law has been seen to set its talons into eligibility 
rules.20   
A. National Basketball Association  
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Haywood v. National Basketball 
Association, 21 the first successful player antitrust case regarding eligibility 
rules in the National Basketball Association (“NBA”).  A professional bas-
ketball team signed Haywood before his college class graduated.  At the 
time, the NBA eligibility rules required players to have surpassed the 
graduation date of their college class and the NBA Commissioner moved 
to block Haywood’s ability to join the team.22  Haywood won his district 
court antitrust claim by showing that the restraint was a group boycott and 
  
 19. All-star celebrity athletes like Kobe Bryant and LeBron James are known for bypassing college 
and jumping directly from high school into multi-million dollar professional contracts and lucrative 
sponsorship deals, bypassing college.  See ESPN, The List: Most Hyped Phenoms, http://espn.go.com/ 
page2/s/list/hypedphenoms.html (accessed Sept. 29, 2005).  And the players keep getting younger, 
“InterMilan offered Adu a $750,000-a-year deal just to build a relationship. Oh, and Adu was offered 
the contract and [sic] the age of 10!” Ben Shlesinger, Adu Plays First Pro Game, 
http://www.thesentinel.com/print/284310758319126.php (accessed Sept. 29, 2005). 
 20. See infra pt. II(A) and accompanying text (discussing cases where leagues and employers either 
failed or declined to raise labor related defenses despite the presence of collective bargaining agree-
ments). 
 21. 401 U.S. at 1205. 
 22. Id. 
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therefore a per se antitrust violation.23  The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and reinstated the district court injunction, temporarily forbidding the 
league from taking sanctions against Haywood’s team for signing him.24   
In the aftermath of Haywood, several district courts found federal anti-
trust violations in player eligibility rules that were considered bars to entry 
into the market.  These violations were only found where the facts demon-
strated that the rules were not reached through the collective bargaining 
process.25 
Following Haywood’s reinstatment of the district court order granting 
injunctive relief in favor of the player, the district court ruled Denver 
Rockets v. All-Pro Management26 in favor of Haywood and the union.  The 
district court held that the NBA Bylaws were a group boycott and therefore 
illegal per se.27  Section 2.05 of the NBA Bylaws prohibited any qualified 
players from negotiating with any NBA team until four years after his high 
school class graduation.28  The court ruled that the restraint, absent any 
option for appeal, constituted a group boycott within antitrust laws, which 
is a primary concerted refusal to deal wherein actors at one level (NBA 
teams) refused to deal with actors at another level (those ineligible under 
four year rule).29   
B. Unites States Football League  
In another district court case, Boris v. United States Football 
League, 30 Boris, an aspiring football player, was prevented from playing 
in the United States Football League (“USFL”) because he failed to meet 
any of the three requirements of the league rule.  The court found as a mat-
ter of uncontested fact that the USFL teams were economic competitors 
and granted partial summary judgment to Boris’s allegation that the rule 
  
 23. Id. at 1204-05. 
 24. Id. at 1206-07 (noting that a quick resolution was required due to the immediate need to deter-
mine if Haywood could play for a Seattle NBA team in the ongoing playoffs). 
 25. See infra pts. II(A)-(B) and accompanying text (discussing district court cases which found 
player eligibility restraints to be antitrust violations where labor law exceptions were not raised in 
defense). 
 26. 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066-67 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 27. Id. at 1067 (recognizing a group boycott as a violation of antitrust laws). 
 28. Id. at 1055. 
 29. Id. at 1058, 1066. 
 30. 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, 3, 7 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (requiring “1) all college football eligibility 
of such player has expired, or 2) at least five (5) years shall have elapsed since the player first entered 
or attended a recognized junior college, college or university or 3) such player received a diploma from 
a recognized college or university”). 
File: Sia (macro) Created on:  12/20/2005 12:25:00 AM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:32:00 AM 
160 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1 
constituted a group boycott and was therefore a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act. 31 
C. World Hockey Association 
In 1977, a district court heard a similar antitrust claim, this time with 
professional hockey, Linseman v. World Hockey Association,32 and held 
that the eligibility rules were a group boycott and therefore illegal per se. 
Linseman, a 19-year-old amateur, was prevented from playing by the 
World Hockey Association (“WHA”) eligibility rules, and he subsequently 
challenged them as an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act.33  The WHA regulation prohibited persons under the age of 
twenty from playing professional hockey for any team within the WHA.34  
The district court ruled in favor of Linseman, finding a “great likelihood” 
that the regulation would qualify as a classic case of a per se illegal con-
certed boycott without redemption by either an act of state doctrine or an 
economic compulsion argument.35 
D. New Era of Interpretation 
Although the judicial system has been able to find antitrust violations 
in player eligibility rules that acted to restrain player eligibility, these cases 
were ruled in an era considered by many to have a judicial system, fueled 
with an antedated interpretation of antitrust law.36  Further, the leagues in 
the above cases either failed or declined to rely on their collective bargain-
ing agreements to receive protection under national labor laws.  In more 
recent cases, the leagues (and players) have relied on the labor exceptions 
to antitrust law in order to deflect many of these antitrust charges.  As will 
be discussed later in the analysis of the legal background, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted relevant antitrust and labor statutes to require a non-
statutory labor exception to antitrust cases where certain conditions are 
met.37  This interpretation, lacking clear delineation upon its pronounce-
ment, has led to a split in the circuits and many highly controversial deci-
  
 31. Id. at 5, 8. 
 32. 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320, 1323 (D. Conn. 1977). 
 33. Id. at 1317. 
 34. Id. at 1318. 
 35. Id. at 1325. 
 36. See e.g. Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law:  Text, Cases, Problems 234, 
200-01 (3d ed., West 2004) (stating that the federal judges who decided the above three cases applied 
“rather strange versions of the per se antitrust ban on group boycotts . . . an approach clearly incom-
patible with the Rule of Reason now used in all appellate sports cases”).  
 37. See infra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text. 
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sions impacting the nature of professional sports and the labor industry in 
general.38   
In the landmark labor antitrust case of Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the 
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the intersection between antitrust and 
labor law by setting forth the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust 
law.  Brown prohibits the blind application of antitrust law to the results of 
the collective bargaining processes and instead requires courts to determine 
whether the restraints should fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRB.39 
III.  CLARETT’S CASE AGAINST THE NFL 
A. Facts 
Former OSU star running back Maurice Clarett has accomplished an 
impressive resume in the amateur football arena.40  Unfortunately, prior to 
the start of the 2004 college football season Clarett was suspended from 
collegiate football, resulting in his attempt to turn professional by entering 
the 2004 NFL draft.41  Clarett faced the NFL Eligibility Rules, which are 
referenced in the current NFL CBA and effectively prohibit any players 
from entering into the annual draft unless they have exhausted a period of 
three years (or three full football seasons) after their high school gradua-
tion.42  
The NFL is the premier professional football league in North America 
and has, since 1925, required all would-be players to wait a “sufficient 
period of time after graduating high school to accommodate and encourage 
college attendance before entering the NFL draft.”43  The current CBA was 
agreed upon by the NFL and the players union, NFLPA, in 1993 and is in 
force until 2007.44  Within the terms of the CBA are three separate provi-
sions which reference the NFL Constitution and Bylaws (containing the 
Eligibility Rules), most notably Article III Section 1, stating: 
  
 38. See infra pt. IV(C) and accompanying text (discussing the differing interpretations of the non-
statutory labor exception as recognized by the Eighth Circuit and the Second Circuit). 
 39. See e.g. Steven D. Buchholz, Run, Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding Employers’ Ability to Uni-
laterally Impose Conditions of Employment after Impasse in Brown v. Pro Football, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 
1201, 1226-27 (1997) (stating that the Supreme Court recognized the congressional intent of labor law 
and policy and by averring that issues of unfair labor practice properly fall under the jurisdiction of the 
NLRB).   
 40. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125-26 (noting Clarett’s accomplishments to include Big Ten Freshman of 
the Year, being a freshman starting running back in a league known for its prolific running backs, and 
leading his team to victory at a national championship at the 2003 Fiesta Bowl). 
 41. Id. (the reasons for Clarett’s suspension controversial but irrelevant to the legal issue at hand). 
 42. Id. at 126, 128.  
 43. Id. at 126. 
 44. Id. at 127. 
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[T]here will be no change in the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement without mutual consent . . . if any proposed change in 
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws during the term of this Agree-
ment could significantly affect the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of NFL players, then the NFLMC will give the NFLPA 
notice of and negotiate the proposed change in good faith.45  
In 1993, the Bylaws included Article XII, entitled “Eligibility of Play-
ers,” which prohibited teams from drafting any players who had not ex-
hausted their college football eligibility, graduated college, or been out of 
high school for five football seasons.46  In May of 1993, representatives of 
the NFL and NFLPA signed a letter confirming acceptance of the then 
current Constitution and Bylaws.47 The Special Eligibility Rules were ac-
cepted into the Constitution and Bylaws and effectively into the CBA with 
no apparent contention by the NFLPA.48  Notably, after the Constitution 
and Bylaws were revised, evidence was submitted to show that the terms 
were accepted by the NFLPA through the collective bargaining process.49  
Nearly ten years into the CBA, Article XII was amended to (1) require that 
all potential players have exceeded four seasons prior to being eligible for 
draft selection, with a right to appeal to the Commissioner for special eli-
gibility and (2) reference a 1990 memorandum by the Commissioner, de-
fining applications for special eligibility as being “accepted only from col-
lege players as to whom three full college seasons have elapsed since their 
high school graduation.”50 
B. Procedural History 
On September 23, 2003, Maurice Clarett challenged the Eligibility 
Rules as an unreasonable restraint on his entry into the professional foot-
ball market and, therefore, subject to antitrust violation.  The NFL re-
sponded by arguing that the Eligibility Rules were agreed upon through 
  
 45. Id. at 127-28 (stating the references as (1) within the Scope of Agreement - providing the 
NFLPA notice of any proposed changes to the Constitution and Bylaws with the ability to good faith 
negotiations; (2) that neither party will be involved in suit related to existing provisions of the Constitu-
tion and Bylaws; and (3) any grievances arising under the Constitution or Bylaws pertaining to terms 
and conditions of employment are subject to the grievance procedures detailed in the CBA). 
 46. Id. at 127. 
 47. Id. at 128 (citing declaration by Peter Ruocco, Senior V.P. of Labor Relations at NFLMC, that 
leading “to the [collective bargaining agreement], the [challenged] eligibility rule itself was the subject 
of collective bargaining”).  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (noting that the declaration of Mr. Ruocco, averred that the Eligibility Rules themselves were 
the subject of collective bargaining). 
 50. Id. (citing to 1990 memorandum, emphasis in original). 
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collective bargaining and therefore protected by the antitrust non-statutory 
exemption and that Clarett lacked standing to bring the suit.51   
The court rejected the defenses raised by the NFL.52  First, the district 
court applied the Mackey Factors, a three-part test set forth by the Eighth 
Circuit in 1976, and did not find a non-statutory exemption.53  The court 
held that the Eligibility Rules were (1) not a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining; (2) only impacted potential players who were strangers to 
the bargaining agreement; and (3) were not shown to be the product of 
arm’s-length negotiations.54  Next the district court rejected the standing 
defense, holding that a restraint on a NFL player’s ability to work is a suf-
ficient injury for antitrust purposes.55 
Proceeding to the merits of Clarett’s claim, the district court applied 
the Rule of Reason,56 and found that the Eligibility Rules were so blatantly 
anticompetitive that they warranted only a “quick look,” resulting in a find-
ing that the restraint was unreasonable because of the availability of less 
restrictive alternative means.57  On February 5, 2004, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Clarett and ordered the NFL to in-
state Clarett for the 2004 draft.58  The NFL appealed and on March 30, 
2004 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed to 
hear the appeal less than one week before the NFL draft.59  
C. Second Circuit’s Ruling 
The issue before the Second Circuit was whether federal labor laws fa-
voring and governing the collective bargaining process precluded the ap-
plication of the antitrust laws to the NFL Eligibility Rules.60  The Second 
  
 51. Id. at 129. 
 52. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382. 
 53. Id. at 391.  The Mackey Factors being an inquiry as to (1) whether the parties involved were 
parties to collective bargaining agreements; (2) whether the agreements were pertaining to mandatory 
subjects of bargaining; and (3) whether the agreement was product of bona fide arm’s-length negotia-
tions.  If the three factors are answered in the affirmative, the restraint would be subject to the non-
statutory labor exception. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614-15; see also infra pt. IV(C) and accompanying text 
regarding Mackey. 
 54. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393-97. 
 55. Id. at 398. 
 56. Id. at 405.  Further, the Rule of Reason is a merit based test weighing anticompetitive effects 
against procompetitive effects related to an alleged antitrust violation.  Where anticompetitive effects 
outweigh any procompetitive effects, the court must find an antitrust violation.  Natl. Socy. of Prof. 
Engrs. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) [hereinafter Prof. Engrs.]. 
 57. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at. 408-10 (explaining that certain anticompetitive effects were so 
strong that the court need perform only a cursory and brief inquiry into the Rule of Reason balance 
before finding an antitrust violation). 
 58. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 130, 138. 
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Circuit answered in the affirmative, and reversed and remanded, vacating 
the district court order that made Clarett eligible for the 2004 NFL draft.61 
In analyzing this issue, the Second Circuit reiterated the position that 
this area of law is at the crossroads of antitrust and labor law, “an area of 
law marked more by controversy than by clarity.”62  In addressing the issue 
on appeal (whether the non-statutory exemption applied to the Eligibility 
Rules), Judge Sotomayor provided a clarification of the relevant antitrust 
and labor laws, precedent and policies.63   
The Second Circuit reviewed Supreme Court precedent which posited, 
but never precisely delineated, the boundaries of the non-statutory excep-
tion.  In doing so, the unanimous opinion by the three-judge panel declined 
to follow the Mackey Factors set forth by the Eighth Circuit and instead 
relied on its own binding precedent to clarify the groundwork set forth by 
the Supreme Court over the past half century.64  Judge Sotomayor distin-
guished Clarett from Mackey (which has never been adopted by the Sec-
ond Circuit) and Supreme Court cases – involving antitrust claims raised 
by employers in the presence of labor-management relations governed by 
collective bargaining agreements65 – by noting that unlike those cases, 
Clarett involved a claim by an employee (albeit a potential employee) and 
not a competing employer.66  Clarett noted that “to permit antitrust suits 
against sports leagues on the ground that their concerted action imposed a 
restraint upon the labor market would seriously undermine many of the 
policies embodied by these labor laws.”67  Further, Clarett interpreted the 
1996 Supreme Court decision in Brown, relying on earlier Second Circuit 
cases, setting forth a rule that the non-statutory labor exception applied 
where professional athletes brought antitrust claims against their employers 
for any restraints resulting from the collective bargaining process concern-
ing mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.68 
Clarett ruled that the non-statutory exception shielded the Eligibility 
Rules from antitrust violation and declined to venture further into an analy-
sis on the merits of antitrust law.  The court dismissed Clarett’s claim of a 
  
 61. Id. at 130, 138, 143.  
 62. Id. at 130 (quoting itself in Wood, 809 F.2d at 959, from 17 years earlier). 
 63. See id. at 131 (inferring the definition of the non-statutory exemption from Brown). 
 64. Id. at 134 (stating that Mackey “does not comport with the Supreme Court’s most recent treat-
ment of the non-statutory labor exemption in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996)”). 
 65. Infra pt. IV(B) discussing Supreme Court precedent in detail. 
 66. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134 (explaining through footnote 14 that other jurisdictions have followed 
the same pre-Brown interpretation that non-statutory labor exceptions require stronger deferral to labor 
law for restraints felt predominantly in labor markets). 
 67. Id. at 135.  
 68. Id. at 138 (concluding that “our prior decisions in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood . . . fully com-
port – in approach and result – with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, we regard them as control-
ling authority”). 
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per se antitrust violation by noting that Clarett’s ineligibility was the result 
of the NFL CBA which invoked the application of federal labor laws and 
policies.  The court proceeded to address the NFL appeal according to ju-
dicial interpretation of the non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law.69 
Further, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s failure to 
classify the Eligibility Rules as a mandatory subject of bargaining, reason-
ing that precedent supported a finding that terms of employment are man-
datory subjects and the direct relationship that employee competition had 
on wages and working conditions for all employees.70  Next, the court held 
that the Eligibility Rules were mandatory subjects of bargaining because 
they influenced terms of initial employment, wages and working condi-
tions and were a part of the CBA.71  Lastly, the court addressed the rela-
tionship between the CBA and the Eligibility Rules and concluded that 
Eligibility Rules were a mandatory bargaining subject and therefore ex-
empt from antitrust law; the court explained that the NFLPA acquiescence 
to the 2003 amendment served as an acceptance in accordance with the 
collective bargaining process.72 
Clarett observed that to allow an antitrust suit would not violate stare 
decisis by departing from Supreme Court and circuit law. Therefore, 
Clarett held that the non-statutory exception applied to the Eligibility 
Rules and reversed the lower court injunction order to permit Clarett to 
enter the draft.73   
IV.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Antitrust Labor Exemptions  
In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act to generally promote free 
competition and prohibit any restraints on trade and commerce.74  In 1914, 
Congress passed the Clayton Act as a statutory exception, protecting cer-
  
 69. Id. at 138-39 (noting that the collective bargaining process may lead to some disfavored em-
ployees, but seeks the best deal for the players overall). 
 70. Id. at 139-40 (explaining that entrance of competing employees would affect wages and work 
standards for new and old employees). 
 71. Id. at 139-41, 143 (holding that the terms were terms of the NFL CBA and therefore shielded 
from antitrust scrutiny and declining to address whether the Eligibility Rules were as a matter of law 
incorporated by reference into the CBA through the Constitution and Bylaws). 
 72. Id. at 142. 
 73. Id. at 143. 
 74. The Sherman Act states in part that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); see Northern Pac. Ry. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) 
(“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserv-
ing free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”). 
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tain labor activities from antitrust violations.75  To further shield organized 
labor activities from antitrust violation, Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932.76  Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Wagner 
Act, or National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”), which embodies 
the core of U.S. labor relations policy.77  Within these four statutes, Con-
gress established a general prohibition on anti-competitive acts that would 
restrain trade and commerce and then clarified a national policy promoting 
and protecting unionized labor.78  The fundamental conflict between the 
antitrust prohibition on anticompetitive collusion and labor policies pro-
moting unionization and collective bargaining has led to nearly a century 
of litigation.79 This long running friction has recently found professional 
sports as the focal arena of contention between labor and employers.80  
In addition to the statutory exemption expressed in the Clayton Act, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted 15 U.S.C. to allow for certain non-
statutory exemptions from antitrust violations.81  The antitrust labor ex-
emptions (statutory and non-statutory) have led to much confusion and 
litigation.82  National labor policy clearly promotes the benefits of equal 
powered bargaining during contractual negotiations to allow employers 
and employees to reach a mutually beneficial contract.83  The goal of col-
lective bargaining is to allow for parity during negotiations, and this collu-
sion of actors, among employers (horizontal consumers competing for la-
bor) and among employees (horizontal suppliers competing to provide 
  
 75. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130 (giving examples of statutory exception to include boycotts and 
picketing).  
 76. U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) (holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act immunized 
certain labor activities from antitrust action, protecting strikes, picketing, and other forms of employee 
self help). 
 77. John J. Baroni, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.:  Labor’s Antitrust Touchdown Called Back;  United 
States Supreme Court Reinforces Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from Antitrust Laws 33 Tulsa L.J. 
401, 403 (1997). 
 78. Id. at 403-04; Shawn Treadwell, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from the 
Antitrust Laws, in the Context of Professional Sports, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 955, 960 (1996). 
 79. Jonathan P. Heyl, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.:  Pulling a Tarp of Antitrust Immunity over the 
Entire Playing Field and Leaving the Game 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1030, 1030 (1997); See National Labor 
Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (stating purpose of Act). Section 7 of the Act guarantees that 
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 
157 (1982). 
 80. Weiler & Roberts, supra n. 36, at 222. 
 81. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 
(1975) (stating that "[t]he nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the 
association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions"). 
 82. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959 (stating in part “[t]he interaction of the [antitrust laws] and federal labor 
legislation is an area of law marked more by controversy than by clarity”). 
 83. Baroni, supra n. 77, at 403 (discussing Congress’ creation of a system of countervailing powers 
through collective bargaining). 
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labor) runs a direct course into antitrust violation.84  Litigation in the area 
defined by the collision of these two federal policies has raised many unan-
swered questions regarding the scope and the effectiveness of the non-
statutory labor exemption.85 
Where the alleged antitrust violation does not fall under a labor exemp-
tion (where courts have found that neither the statutory nor the non-
statutory labor exception wards the alleged restraint from antitrust viola-
tion), courts have proceeded to determine if the violation is per se illegal.86  
The Silver Exception precludes a per se antitrust violation where the facts 
show support for the restraint.87  In situations where the Silver Exception 
applied, the analysis would proceed to determine if the alleged restraint 
was permitted under the Rule of Reason (the restraint being unreasonable 
based either on (1) the nature or character of the restraint, or (2) on sur-
rounding circumstances leading to a presumption of intended restraint of 
trade or enhanced prices).88  The Supreme Court has held that this reason-
ableness test should only include consideration of economic factors and not 
policy considerations that may have been considered in the per se analy-
sis.89   
B. Historic Supreme Court Law Regarding Non-Statutory Exemption     
Over the past half century, the Supreme Court has heard a handful of 
cases addressing the interplay between national labor policy (under the 
Clayton Act, Norris-LaGuardia Act and NLRA) and federal antitrust law 
(under the Sherman Act).  The following Supreme Court cases leading up 
to Brown set forth that to claim the non-statutory exemption, parties exclu-
sive to a bargaining relationship must bargain in good faith when negotiat-
  
 84. Id. at 403-04. 
 85. See infra pts. III(C), IV(C) and V (regarding differing rationale from Second and Eighth Cir-
cuits).  
 86. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364-67 (1963); see U.S. Trotting Assn. v. Chicago 
Downs Assn., 665 F.2d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 1981) (recognizing acceptance of Silver based exception 
to antitrust cases particularly in organized sports). 
 87. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064-65; see also Itri, supra n. 13, at 307-08 (interpreting 
the Silver Exception to avoid per se illegality if (1) the industry requires self-regulation; “(2) the collec-
tive action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with a policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is 
reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more extensive than necessary; and (3) the association 
provides procedural safeguards which ensure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a basis 
for judicial review”). 
 88. Prof. Engrs., 435 U.S. at 690, 694-95 (finding the Society’s restraint on competition unreason-
able because the restraint on competitive bidding, although not price fixing on its face, prevented all 
customers from making price comparisons). 
 89. See id. at 692 (noting that the Rule of Reason analysis only requires accounting for economic 
considerations). 
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ing hours, wages, and working conditions (mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining).90   
1. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers 
The Supreme Court first addressed the non-statutory labor exception in 
1945 when it decided a case brought by a non-local employer of electrical 
workers against the union for allegedly colluding with local employers to 
“monopolize all the business in New York City.”91  The Court, recognizing 
that the union sought the agreements with local employers in order to ob-
tain desirable wages and conditions, held that the non-statutory labor ex-
ception did not apply in cases such as this, where the union colluded with 
“employers and manufacturers of goods to restrain competition, in, and to 
monopolize the marketing of, such goods.”92 
2. United Mine Workers v. Pennington 
Twenty years later, in 1965, the Supreme Court heard United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington93  and declined to find an exception to the Sherman 
Act based on actions by a union to promote the monopoly power of certain 
employers. A small coal mine operator alleged that the coal mining indus-
try had been trapped by a collective bargaining agreement, where employ-
ers colluded with the mine workers union to set wages at a level where 
certain operators would be financially unable to compete and thereby 
forced out of business.94  The Court recognized that § 20 of the Clayton 
Act and § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically removed the exis-
tence of labor unions from the grasps of antitrust laws.95  Still, the Court 
iterated a limitation to the extent of the exception, stating “a union forfeits 
its exemption from antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has 
agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other 
bargaining units.”96  Pennington went on to set forth that the labor excep-
  
 90. Treadwell, supra n. 78, at 961. 
 91. Allen Bradley Co. v. Loc. No. 3, Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 798-800, 809 (1945). 
 92. Id. at 798, 810 (emphasis added).  Notably, the Court recognized the restraint to be a direct 
impact on the goods, therefore being an impact on the business of the marketing and supply of these 
goods to the public. 
 93. 381 U.S. 657, 661 (1965).  
 94. Id. at 659-61. 
 95. Id. at 661-62. 
 96. Id. at 665. 
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tion existed as a means to allow the Sherman Act and the NLRA to harmo-
nize and co-exist.97 
3. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea98 decided the same day as 
Pennington, involved a claim by a meat seller that a butchers union in Chi-
cago had agreed with a meat sellers trade association to limit the hours of 
operation in order to stifle competition with certain sellers.  The Supreme 
Court noted that the “hours restriction” was to control the hours in the 
workday and also to restrict nighttime competition by non-unionized la-
borers.  One of the sellers, Jewel Tea Company, signed the agreement un-
der threat of an employee strike and subsequently brought suit against the 
union and the association under § 1 of the Sherman Act.   
Jewel Tea was the first time the Supreme Court identified and recog-
nized a non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law.99  A plurality held 
that the “hours restriction” was protected by the non-statutory exemption, 
but for differing reasons.100  Justice White, writing for himself and two 
other justices, balanced the interests of the unionized workers against any 
anti-competitive impact on the market.101  White found no antitrust viola-
tion, because the marketing-hours restriction was “so intimately related to 
wages, hours, and working conditions that the . . . bona fide, arm’s-length 
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies . . . [is] exempt from 
the Sherman Act.”102  Goldberg, concurring in the judgment but under dif-
ferent reasoning, agreed in the application of the exemption but stated that 
no balancing was needed because all collective bargaining activity con-
cerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA is outside the 
grasp of antitrust laws.103  Justice Douglas and the two other remaining 
  
 97. Id.; Baroni, supra n. 77, at 414. 
 98. 381 U.S. 676, 680-81 (1965) (setting forth a notably split decision showing the disagreement 
amongst the court as to the boundaries of the non-statutory exemption).  
 99. See id. at 689-90 (recognizing that marketing-hours restrictions are so “intimately related to 
wages, hours and working conditions” that they are similarly exempt from the Sherman Act even 
though not statutorily exempt). 
 100. Id. at 698 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
 101. Id. at 689, 691. 
 102. Id. at 689-90 (also stating that “national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations 
Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how 
long, employees must work.  An agreement on these subjects between the union and the employers in a 
bargaining unit is not illegal under the Sherman Act, nor is the union's unilateral demand for the same 
contract of other employers in the industry”). 
 103. Id. at 711-12 (stating that the NLRA “declares it to be the policy of the United States to promote 
the establishment of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment by free collective 
bargaining between employers and unions. . . This national scheme would be virtually destroyed by the 
imposition of Sherman Act criminal and civil penalties upon employers and unions engaged in such 
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justices dissented on the grounds that the agreement was subject to anti-
trust laws and not exempted.104 
4. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumber & Steamfitters Loc. No. 100  
A decade after Jewel Tea, the Supreme Court again addressed the non-
statutory exemption in Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumber & 
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.105  This case involved a labor union’s 
requirement that contractors hire subcontractors which employed union 
members.  Connell, a contractor, sued the union arguing that the union’s 
efforts to compel contractors to only hire work from certain subcontractors 
violated antitrust law. 106  The six-justice majority refused to apply the anti-
trust non-statutory labor exception, and remanded, holding that the agree-
ment was not protected by any labor exemptions.107  Connell held that the 
non-statutory exception applied only to agreements achieved through a 
collective bargaining relationship.108  Notably, the court recognized that 
certain union activities (although in the presence of collective bargaining) 
would cause “significant adverse effects on the market and on consumers – 
effects unrelated to the union’s legitimate goals” and could be outside of 
the non-statutory labor exception shield.109 
These four cases set the relevant case law precedent for the circuits to 
interpret and apply the non-statutory labor exception.  The limited extent of 
case law has been a particularly troubling point of contention between the 
circuits (particularly between the Second Circuit and Eighth Circuit’s in-
terpretations of how employee-raised claims are to be handled in situations 
governed by the collective bargaining process).110  A critical point of de-
parture in the interpretation of the non-statutory labor exception has devel-
oped when determining whether the exception has a different standard 
when applied to employer and employee raised claims, business and labor 
market claims, respectively.111 
  
collective bargaining. To tell the parties that they must bargain about a point but may be subject to 
antitrust penalties if they reach an agreement is to stultify the congressional scheme”). 
 104. Id. at 697. 
 105. 421 U.S. at 619. 
 106. Id. at 618-19, 620-21. 
 107. Id. at 625. 
 108. Id. at 635. 
 109. Id. at 624 (emphasis added, meaning consumer market and not the labor market per se); see 
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley,  The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for Anticompetitive 
Litigation, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 757, 785-86 (1992) (recognizing Connell found the union activity outside of 
the labor exception because by properly distinguishing anticompetitive restraints on business markets 
from restraints in labor markets, here the restraints on business were substantially anticompetitive to the 
degree beyond any non-statutory labor exemption). 
 110. See infra pt. IV(C) (Eighth and Second Circuit interpretations) and accompanying text. 
 111. See id. (Brown discussion) and accompanying text. 
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C. Regional Application of Non-Statutory Labor Exception 
1. The Eighth Circuit Interpretation  
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit decided Mackey, where a group of NFL 
players brought an antitrust action against the NFL Rozelle Rule, which 
allows the league commissioner to require any club acquiring a free agent 
to compensate the player’s former club.112  The Eighth Circuit relied heav-
ily on Supreme Court precedent,113 in averring that a non-statutory excep-
tion would apply if the three following inquiries were answered in the af-
firmative:  (1) whether the parties involved were parties to collective bar-
gaining agreements; (2) whether the agreements were pertaining to manda-
tory subjects of bargaining; and (3) whether the agreement was product of 
bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.114 
Mackey answered the first two prongs in the affirmative, but held that 
the Rozelle Rule was not the product of bona fide arm’s-length negotia-
tions.115  Mackey found sufficient evidence to support a holding that the 
restraint was not the product of bona-fide arm’s-length negotiations be-
cause it was unilaterally imposed by the NFL without a quid pro quo, or 
mutual consideration.116  Proceeding to a merit based analysis under anti-
trust principles, the court found that despite there being an issue between 
players against their employer, it was still a business or product market 
restraint and subject to antitrust analysis.117  First, the court addressed the 
rule under a per se violation analysis and found that restraint would be 
better analyzed under the Rule of Reason.118  Ultimately, Mackey found 
that the Rozelle Rule violated the Rule of Reason because it was an unrea-
sonable restraint on labor conditions.119  Having found the restraint unrea-
  
 112. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609. 
 113. Id. at 613-15 (relying heavily on Connell, Jewel Tea, and Pennington for interpretation of gov-
erning principles behind the non-statutory labor exception to require a three question analysis). 
 114. Id. at 614-15; see Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market:  the Failure 
of Stare Decisis, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 337, 392-94 (1996) (arguing that the court’s requirement of bona-
fide arm’s-length negotiations to lack any principled justification because it would undermine the 
NLRA mandate against government interference in private labor issues). 
 115. 543 F.2d at 615-16. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 616-22 (rejecting the NFL’s argument that the restraint on players’ services was a restraint 
on labor and not a product market, the latter being prohibited by antitrust law and the former being 
exempted by the Clayton Act). 
 118. Id. at 619-20 (finding (1) traditional per se violations were for claims between business competi-
tors, not between union and employers, and (2) that the goal of minimizing the need for intensive 
inquiries into the market, was not applicable because of the lower court’s exhaustive analysis). 
 119. Id. at 620-21 (finding substantial evidence that player mobility and salaries were unreasonably 
restrained because the rule was more restrictive than necessary to protect any interests of the NFL). 
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sonably anticompetitive, the court held that the Rozelle Rule was an anti-
trust violation.120 
About a decade after Mackey, the Eighth Circuit decided Powell v. Na-
tional Football League.121  Powell involved an antitrust claim that the post-
impasse NFL imposition of the college draft and uniform players’ contract 
terms constituted unlawful restraints of competition.122  Powell ultimately 
held that the present case was subject to the non-statutory labor exception 
because the alleged restraint was a product of an ongoing collective bar-
gaining process and therefore shielded by the non-statutory labor excep-
tion.123  Powell has been interpreted to set forth a rule (which was notably 
not followed by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Pro Football)124 that anti-
trust law did not apply to any situations which involved labor law (where a 
union represented employees in a collective bargaining process).125 
2. The Second Circuit Law  
In contrast to Mackey, the Second Circuit has declined to follow a spe-
cific three-part test to determine the extent of the non-statutory exemp-
tion.126  In 1984, 12 years before Brown, the Second Circuit decided Wood 
v. National Basketball Association127; Wood held that the NBA’s rules re-
garding College Draft, Right of First Refusal, and Revenue Sharing/Salary 
Cap System were part of the NBA CBA and were mandatory subjects of 
bargaining.  Wood was drafted into the NBA and later challenged the draft 
process and salary caps as limiting competition for college players.128  The 
court appreciated that rules prohibiting Wood from becoming a free agent 
were to his detriment, but went on to explain the union was under no obli-
gation to please everyone; rather, the union had properly sought the best 
  
 120. Id. at 622-23. 
 121. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) (the author notes that this case was not followed by the Supreme 
Court in Brown, but is being discussed as a useful reference to understand Eighth Circuit application of 
the non-statutory labor exception). 
 122. Id. at 1295. 
 123. Id. at 1304.  Powell stated that “as long as there is a possibility that proceedings may be com-
menced before the Board, or until final resolution of Board proceedings and appeals there from, the 
labor relationship continues and the labor exemption applies.”  Id. at 1303-04. 
 124. See infra pts. IV(2)-(3) and accompanying text (Brown declined to follow the Eighth Circuit’s 
blanket application of the non-statutory labor exception to all situations that were found to be part of 
the collective bargaining process.). 
 125. Student Author, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory 
Labor Exception, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 874-75 (1991). 
 126. See infra pt. IV(C)(2) (finding support to not follow Mackey from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
lack of mention of the Mackey Factors when deciding Brown). 
 127. 809 F.2d at 954.  
 128. Id. at 958. 
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overall deal for the players through the collective bargaining process.129  
The court noted that where union representatives negotiate and deal on 
behalf of labor suppliers, the good of the many would unavoidably lead to 
some laborers having undesirable treatment.130  Here, Wood’s ability to 
become a free agent at his own initiative was not a right that the union had 
secured during the collective bargaining process.131  The court therefore 
held that the terms were negotiated in good faith during the collective bar-
gaining process and therefore were shielded from federal antitrust law.132   
Wood interpreted then current Supreme Court precedent to mandate 
that in collective bargaining situations, employee representatives have the 
power to negotiate terms that could likely be undesirable to many employ-
ees (including employees not in the bargaining unit).133  Further, the court 
importantly noted that the Supreme Court prohibited courts from measur-
ing the value of terms and tactics used during collective bargaining nego-
tiations.134  “We need not determine the precise limits of the rules laid 
down by the cases cited or consider fine distinctions going to whether 
product- or labor-market activities are in issue. Wood's claim . . . impli-
cates the labor market and subverts federal labor policy.”135  Wood de-
clined to precisely lay out the differences between labor and product mar-
ket impacts, but left the door open for further explanation. 
Two years before Brown, the Second Circuit decided National Basket-
ball Association v. Williams.136  In Williams, the NBA sought a court dec-
laration that the continued imposition of certain disputed provisions of the 
then expired CBA were not in violation of antitrust laws, and that disputed 
provisions were lawful even if antitrust laws applied. The players’ union 
counterclaimed, asserting that continued imposition of the terms from the 
expired CBA were antitrust violation.137  The Second Circuit held that the 
non-statutory labor exemption shielded the imposition of terms agreed 
upon from a CBA even after its expiration and into impasse.138 
Later that same year, Caldwell v. American Basketball Association139 
ruled that a CBA between a league and players’ union barred a player from 
  
 129. Id. at 960. 
 130. Id. at 961. 
 131. See id. at 962 (noting that no special judicial exception should allow courts to intervene to strike 
down collective bargaining terms, otherwise the entire process would unravel). 
 132. Id. at 962-63. 
 133. Id. at 960. 
 134. Id at 962 n.5 (stating that courts are not to attempt to measure a quid pro quo in determining if a 
negotiation resulted in even terms). 
 135. Id. at 963. 
 136. 45 F.3d 684, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 693. 
 139. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995). 
File: Sia (macro) Created on:  12/20/2005 12:25:00 AM Last Printed: 12/20/2005 12:32:00 AM 
174 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 4, No. 1 
bringing an otherwise plausible antitrust claim against the league.  A pro-
fessional basketball player brought antitrust and tort action against the 
American Basketball Association (“ABA”) and others, alleging that he was 
blacklisted and prevented from playing professional basketball as a result 
of his activities as president of the players’ union.140  The Second Circuit 
held that the non-statutory labor exemption barred an antitrust claim, in 
that allowing player’s claims to proceed under the Sherman Act would 
subvert fundamental principles of federal labor policy.141  The court then 
noted that labor policy required the NLRB to handle disputes such as 
whether discharge is the result of union activities or for cause.142 
Pre-Brown Second Circuit case law interpreted the non-statutory labor 
exception in labor markets to be highly deferential to national labor law 
and considered that the NLRB had jurisdiction, and not the antitrust 
courts.143  In cases where the alleged violation was raised between a sup-
plier of labor and a consumer of labor, the court interpreted that congress 
specifically desired to shield the results of the collective bargaining process 
from antitrust review.  These Second Circuit cases were further strength-
ened by the Supreme Court in 1996 when it found that an antitrust claim by 
development squad players was exempted by the non-statutory labor ex-
ception despite the NFL and NFLPA being in impasse.144 
3. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 
In 1996, in the midst of this split in the circuits, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to again address the “intersection of the Nation’s labor 
and antitrust laws.”145 Justice Breyer’s opinion set out to clarify the conflict 
between otherwise opposing policies and provided a guide by which the 
non-statutory labor exception could be applied in all labor markets.146  In 
Brown, the NFL and NFLPA had reached an impasse after negotiations to 
renew the CBA had failed.  A group of NFL players claimed that the col-
lective bargaining process had expired and that NFL had violated antitrust 
law by unilaterally setting policy for negotiations with development squad 
players for wages, hours and so forth.147  The issue was whether the NFL 
salary arrangement was protected from antitrust liability by federal labor 
  
 140. Id. at 526. 
 141. Id. at 527, 530. 
 142. Id. at 530 (noting that the NLRA had governed labor disputes for over 50 years in every labor 
market except that of professional sports). 
 143. See supra pt. IV(C)(2) and accompanying text (discussing relevant Second Circuit case law). 
 144. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135. 
 145. Brown, 518 U.S. at 233. 
 146. See Baroni, supra n. 77, at 401. 
 147. Brown, 518 U.S. at 233-35. 
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laws despite the NFL and NFLPA having reached an impasse.148  The 
Court relied on case law precedent and interpretations of antitrust and labor 
law and policy and thereby declined to follow the Eighth Circuit opinions 
from nearly a decade earlier.149   
Brown found that non-statutory exemption applied because to find oth-
erwise would open the flood gates for litigation about much labor law, and 
would allow courts to step into the shoes traditionally occupied by NLRB 
with respect to collective bargaining agreements.150  Justice Breyer noted a 
particular concern raised by the Court in Jewel Tea “about antitrust judges 
‘roaming at large’ through the bargaining process.”151   
Brown noted that all restraints, agreed upon by the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining negotiations, can be considered to be part of the CBA and 
therefore subject to the non-statutory exception.152  By considering the 
impasse still part of the collective bargaining process, Brown recognized 
the scope of the non-statutory exemption to encompass issues external but 
concerning a written collective bargaining agreement.153  Further, the Court 
declined to make a special ruling specific to professional football players 
(although noting that these players do possess some unique characteristics) 
and instead defined the non-statutory labor exemption for all labor markets 
that involve collective bargaining as a means of labor negotiations.154  
Brown’s deference to the NLRB when deciding this employer-raised anti-
trust case was a highly controversial seminal case because it clarified the 
Supreme Court’s position that the non-statutory labor exception strongly 
favored the labor process to address claims raised in a labor market gov-
erned by the collective bargaining process.155   
  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 231-50 (Brown declined to mention or follow the Mackey factors and the Powell interpre-
tation, which favored blanket exemption in cases that involved collective bargaining.); see Weiler & 
Roberts, supra n. 36 and accompanying text (discussing the differing approaches by the Eighth and 
Second Circuits); supra pt. IV(C)(2) and accompanying text (Second Circuit cases which were decided 
in the aftermath of Mackey still declined to follow the Mackey factors and instead provided its own 
interpretations.). 
 150. Id. at 247-48, 250.  
 151. Id. at 248 (noting the opinion of Justice Goldberg in Jewel Tea, and stating that antitrust courts 
are not well equipped to address motives used during tactical negotiations in the collective bargaining 
process).  
 152. Id. at 243-44, 250 (stating that Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell only dealt with agreements 
because of the specific fact patterns, but that the exception was broader).  
 153. Id. at 250 (stating that the conduct at issue took place during and immediately after a collective 
bargaining negotiation, growing out of and directly relating to the bargaining process). 
 154. See id. at 249-50; Baroni, supra n. 77, at 401.  
 155. See e.g. Baroni, supra n. 77, at 402. 
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V.  RESTRAINTS ON LABOR MARKETS VS. RESTRAINTS ON BUSINESS 
MARKETS 
Brown clarified a subtle yet important and long standing principle that 
antitrust laws have long treated labor impacts and business impacts differ-
ently.  In light of the scant Supreme Court cases dealing with the intrica-
cies of the antitrust law non-statutory labor exception, the Second Circuit 
and other circuits have interpreted the few available Supreme Court cases 
to inherently distinguish labor market related cases from business (product) 
market cases which more directly impacted consumers.156   
In Wood, the Second Circuit held that Wood’s arguments that the re-
straints were subject to antitrust law were without valid legal grounds.157  
The court noted that: 
Each of the decisions involved injuries to employers who asserted 
that they were being excluded from competition in the product 
market.  Wood cites no case in which an employee or potential 
employee was able to invalidate a collective agreement on antitrust 
grounds because he or she might have been able to extract more 
favorable terms through individual bargaining.158 
The Second Circuit further stated that it need not specifically delineate 
the different circumstances that would fall into either a product (business) 
market or a labor market analysis under the non-statutory labor excep-
tion.159  Instead, the court explained that these two situations were gov-
erned by separate areas of law, antitrust law and labor law, respectfully; the 
court further opened the door for a later case(s) to provide the proper de-
tailed guidance to distinguish how to handle antitrust claims raised by em-
ployees or employers in collective bargaining defined situations.160  Wood 
and commentators set the stage for a court to further delineate the applica-
tion of the non-statutory labor exception in antitrust allegations raised by 
suppliers of labor – Brown answered the call.161 
  
 156. See supra pt. IV(C)(2) (Second Circuit Law) and accompanying text. 
 157. 809 F.2d at 963. 
 158. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id.; see generally Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The 
Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 Geo. L.J. 19, 20-21 (1986) (noting that in 
situations where employees have elected to unionize and participate in the collective bargaining proc-
ess, any resulting restraints – if purely impacting labor markets – would be shielded from antitrust 
violation; implying that cases which fell between the extremes of pure labor market impacts and pure 
business market impacts would require further guidance by courts). 
 161. By distinguishing the immediate claim by Wood, a player employee, from the employer raised 
issues in Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell, Wood implicitly interpreted employee raised antitrust 
claims which had primary impacts on labor markets as being highly deferential to NLRA and NLRB 
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In 1980, the Third Circuit set forth that "[t]he term nonstatutory ex-
emption . . . is a shorthand description of an interpretation of the Sherman 
Act, making that statute inapplicable to restraints imposed in the interest of 
lawful union monopoly power in the labor market."162  Consolidated Ex-
press v. New York Shipping Association163 interpreted the non-statutory 
labor exception to require deferral to restraints created through collective 
bargaining process if the impact was inflicted primarily in the labor market 
and only peripherally in the business market. 
Two years later, in 1982, the Seventh Circuit decided Mid-America 
Regional Bargaining Association v. Will County Carpenters District 
Council.164  In this case, suppliers of labor brought antitrust claims against 
the union, contractors and the local utility claiming that the defendants had 
conspired together to set wages outside of the collective bargaining proc-
ess.165 The court held that the non-statutory labor exemption applies where 
the alleged restraint “is not a 'direct restraint on the business market' but 
rather a direct restraint on the labor market, with only tangential effects on 
the business market.”166  The actions by the defendants were found to be 
within the boundaries of both the non-statutory and statutory labor excep-
tions to antitrust law because of the indirect business market restraints.167 
VI.  CLARETT – AN ANALYSIS 
Many sports fans and commentators were shocked and surprised when 
the Second Circuit reversed the antitrust violation found by the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York.168  Although many of 
  
jurisdiction and effectively removed from the grasps of antitrust courts.  Legal scholars and commenta-
tors have addressed the periphery of this issue and affirmed the position that some degree of “lessening 
of business competition would have to be tolerated in order to achieve labor policy goals.” Eleanor R. 
Hoffman, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1983).  
Further, only restraints that involved the marketing of goods and services would be subject to antitrust 
law, and where the restraint did not deal with marketing to consumers (business and/or product mar-
kets), the Sherman Act would not apply.  Id. at 48.  
 162. Consol. Express, Inc. v. N.Y. Shipping Assn., 602 F.2d 494, 513 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated on other 
grounds, Intl. Longshoremen’s Assn. v. Consol. Express, Inc., 448 U.S. 902 (1980). 
 163. Id. (citing to Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04, 512 (1940) where Justice Stone 
succinctly explained that where a union’s imposition of wage setting terms were focused on labor 
market and not intended or shown to have a direct impact on the product market).  
 164. 675 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 165. Id. at 883. 
 166. Id. at 893. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Compare e.g. DraftClarett.org, http://www.draftclarett.org/index.html (July 8, 2005) (arguing 
that the NFL’s motives for keeping players out are unreasonable and cost potential players their liveli-
hoods) with e.g. Rick Harrow, The NFL at Draft Time – Business is Great, http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20040607014405/http://www.sportsbusinessnews.com/index.asp?story_id=35349 (June 6, 2004) 
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these commentators may have extensive knowledge of the game and busi-
ness of football, Clarett properly recognizes that the non-statutory labor 
exemption applies to the NFL Eligibility Rules.  Ultimately, labor laws 
governing the collective bargaining process prevailed over the cries of anti-
trust violation, and the Second Circuit properly applied the non-statutory 
labor exception to the Eligibility Rules.169   
The Second Circuit’s decision is a proper interpretation and application 
of the guiding principles behind federal antitrust law and national labor 
law, and its respective policies.  Supreme Court decisions and earlier Sec-
ond Circuit and other circuit case law set a precedent that courts must defer 
to the NLRB in situations where the restraint primarily impacts the labor 
market (such as where an employee claims that they are being restrained in 
their ability to provide labor) which is defined by the collective bargaining 
process.170  The decision was supported by strong rationale based heavily 
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown, and with relevant circuit law.171  
In particular, Clarett declined to openly denounce the Eighth Circuit’s 
Mackey factors, and instead reaffirmed its own earlier interpretations of the 
non-statutory labor exception.172  Clarett reaffirmed the interpretation that 
the exception shields restraints primarily directed to labor markets when 
the restraints are generated through the collective bargaining process.173 
Generally, where the restraint is primarily in a labor market (which is 
focused on the production of human labor) and the result of a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, the non-statutory labor exemption should apply; 
conversely, where the impact of the restraint is primarily focused in a busi-
ness market (which impacts competition and consumer prices) a court 
should look to the Mackey factors as a plausible standard.174 Further, the 
non-statutory labor exception to antitrust law should be understood not as a 
deviation from antitrust law, but rather as coalescence between antitrust 
  
(stating that the court was right to keep Clarett ineligible, not because of antitrust or labor policy but 
merely because “pro football is a tougher mental and physical game than any other sport”).  
 169. See supra pt. III (discussing the outcome of the Clarett case). 
 170. Compare Wood, 809 F.2d at 962-63 (distinguishing cases brought by employers and those 
brought by employees) with Pennington, 381 U.S. at 657 (where the claim was brought by an employer 
against a union that had allegedly colluded with the other employers in the multi-employer bargaining 
unit to impact the business). 
 171. See supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s rationale.). 
 172. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134 n. 14. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See generally Brown, 518 U.S. at 240-41, 251 (explaining that the restraint, a mandatory subject 
of bargaining in a setting dominated by collective bargaining, was highly protected by labor law and 
that since the restraint concerned only the parties at issue – the labor relationship between employer 
and employee – the post-impasse development squad wages were protected from antitrust review; 
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134 n. 14 (citing to support from other jurisdictions in noting the labor market 
restraint where employees raise antitrust claims). 
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and labor laws.175  Under Brown, where the restraint is a mandatory subject 
of bargaining, generated as the result of the collective bargaining process, 
the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law more heavily favors la-
bor policy and requires courts to defer to labor law remedies under the 
authority of the NLRB.176  Conversely, earlier Supreme Court analysis of 
employer-raised antitrust claims alleging collusive behavior between the 
union and competing employers have resulted in a more demanding stan-
dard – favoring antitrust law where restraints focus on business competi-
tion.177   
In light of the post-Brown dual standard approach to the exemption, 
Clarett tackles the question of whether an employee eligibility restraint, 
generated through the collective bargaining process, can be shielded by the 
non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law.  Antitrust law prohibits 
unreasonably anticompetitive restraints in the business market178 and labor 
law promotes the use of collective bargaining as a means to balance the 
power between employees and employers.179  Clarett explains in footnote 
fourteen that antitrust and labor law, although seeming to directly collide, 
can be considered reconciled by the non-statutory labor exemption to dic-
tate distinct legal standards where restraints either primarily impact the 
business or the labor markets.180  
Clarett aptly recognized binding precedent to show that the non-
statutory labor exception shields collective bargaining related restraints in 
cases where the impact is focused primarily on labor markets,181 noting that 
the non-statutory exemption applies “where needed to make the collective 
  
 175. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 130, 135. 
 176. Id. at 134-35 (interpreting the rationale set forth by Brown regarding favoring resolution through 
NRLB action and congressional labor policy of exempting courts from usurping the role of the NLRB). 
 177. See supra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text (discussing historical Supreme Court precedent 
before Brown). 
 178. The Sherman Act was limited by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts to apply to unreason-
able restraints in the commerce, with human labor and collective bargaining being considered outside 
of the definition of commerce. 
 179. This note posits that the infamous intersection between antitrust law and labor law can be 
viewed as a spectrum of coalescing laws where the non-statutory labor exemption can be viewed as 
gray area between antitrust and labor.  The non-statutory labor exception accordingly would lean to-
wards labor policy and deference to NLRA and NLRB in cases which involved restraints more heavily 
related to labor relations (i.e. labor related claims brought by employees against employers or union 
representatives).  Accordingly, the exception would require courts to do a more stringent analysis in 
cases (in accordance with Jewel Tea and related employer raised cases) where the impact was predomi-
nantly focused on the products and business market, and where the collusive activity by the union with 
employer(s) would result in direct anticompetitive impacts on consumers. 
 180. Id. at 134. 
 181. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134-35 (Accordingly, the court supports its interpretation of the law as set 
forth by earlier cases such as Wood, by noting that Brown shared very similar rationale, when it was 
decided over a decade after Mackey.). 
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bargaining process work.”182  Further, Clarett’s holding is proper because 
the Eligibility Rules dictate who is eligible to work, concern which 
amounts to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.183  Commentators 
have, however, voiced disapproval of the Second Circuit ruling.184  These 
opinions fail to recognize the distinct focuses of antitrust law in the busi-
ness market; labor law in the labor market; and the statutory and non-
statutory labor exception to antitrust law to provide a continuum in the 
interplay between these two markets.185   
This note asserts that Clarett properly distinguishes between restraints 
primarily focused in labor markets from those primarily focused in busi-
ness markets by viewing earlier Supreme Court precedent in light of the 
more recent Brown decision.186  This analysis will attempt to shed some 
light on how the non-statutory labor exemption has developed into a dual 
standard system which is flexible to adjust to the seemingly conflicting 
policies of antitrust law and national labor law. 
A. Non-Statutory Labor Exemptions:  Labor Market vs. Business Market 
Commentators have noted that non-statutory labor exemptions to anti-
trust violations apply to restraints generated from collective bargaining, 
where alleged anticompetitive impacts of a restraint are felt only in the 
labor market.187  Clarett interprets Brown (which declined to endorse or 
mention the Mackey factors) to support the pre-Brown governing Second 
Circuit law, that restraints which primarily focus on labor markets are ex-
empted from antitrust law if the restraints deal with mandatory subjects of 
  
 182. Brown, 518 U.S. at 234. 
 183. See supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (discussing the Clarett court’s rationale). 
 184. See e.g. Scott A. Freeman, Student Author, An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The Second 
Circuit’s Blanket Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in Clarett v. NFL, 45 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 155, 190-91 (2004) (providing an unconvincing proposition that the Clarett three judge panel 
interpretation of the Brown Supreme Court eight judge majority opinion – setting forth that collective 
bargaining produced restraints which primarily impact labor markets are subject to the non-statutory 
labor exception – fails to provide clarity and therefore favors the Eight Circuit interpretations). 
 185. See generally Weiler & Roberts, supra n. 36, at 176-78 (averring that anticompetitive restraints 
are usually considered to operate in the product market, whereas player restraints in professional sports 
– and other employer/employee situations – typically involve labor related concerns and do not primar-
ily impact consumer welfare).  
 186. Antitrust Law – Nonstatutory Labor Exemption – Second Circuit Exempts NFL Eligibility Rules 
from Antitrust Scrutiny – Clarett v. National Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), 118 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1379, 1379 (2005) (stating that “[t]his new standard wisely allows for more flexibility in non-
statutory exemption analysis, particularly because it avoids a paramount weakness of the Mackey 
framework: namely, the Eighth Circuit's formulation making determinative the bona fide arm’s-length 
negotiations requirement”) [hereinafter Harv. Antitrust]. 
 187. See e.g. Roberts, supra n. 114, at 338-39. 
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bargaining. 188  Here, Clarett’s antitrust claim that the Eligibility Rules 
barred him from offering his services should be considered to be a restraint 
focused primarily in a labor market because he is complaining of an injury 
suffered as a supplier of labor. 
Employee raised complaints regarding labor practices and employer-
raised complaints regarding anticompetitive business practices differ be-
cause the labor practices are governed primarily by labor law, whereas the 
anticompetitive business practices are governed primarily by antitrust 
law.189  Furthermore, restraints primarily focused in labor markets, (“labor 
restraints”) have been considered to be exempt where the restraints have 
actually created lower prices and monopoly power (where the anticompeti-
tive power is held by the buyer and not the seller).190  As such, Clarett’s 
claim should be considered to be a labor restraint and not a business mar-
ket restraint because it involves a restraint where employers and employees 
have agreed to limit the supply of labor.  
Prior to Brown, courts applied the non-statutory labor exemption with 
limited Supreme Court guidance.191  Mackey addressed an employee raised 
claim under a similar analysis as provided in Jewel Tea, Pennington, and 
Connell, all of which addressed employer-raised claims.  Other jurisdic-
tions, including the Second Circuit, however, distinguished employee 
raised claims from employer-raised claims.192  This recognition is ulti-
mately an appreciation for the difference between labor markets (which 
have been deemed by Congress to be primarily governed by National La-
bor Law and policy) and business markets (which are primarily governed, 
inter alia, by antitrust law).193 
There is a tempting but misled tendency to treat both the labor and 
product markets in a similar fashion; after all, both markets ultimately im-
pact the end consumers (indirectly and directly, respectively).  Further, 
both markets involve consumers and suppliers.  Reading the Sherman Act 
  
 188. See supra pt. V and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s interpretation that there 
is a distinction in labor market related restraints, as supported by Brown). 
 189. Roberts, supra, n. 114, at 338-40 (discussing the impact of the non-statutory labor exception to 
labor markets and how there has been some case law support even outside of professional sports). 
 190. See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass. Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 930-31 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.) (not-
ing that the lower prices resulting from the health service consumer should not be scrutinized by the 
antitrust court).  Here, the buyer of labor is the NFL and the supplier of labor is Clarett.   
 191. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 131; John Gerba, Student Author, Instant Reply: A Review of the Case of 
Maurice Clarett, the Application of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, and its Protection of the NFL 
Draft Eligibility Rules, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2383, 2414-15 (2005). 
 192. See supra pt. V and accompanying text (where claims raised by employees in the context of 
suppliers of labor are typically directed towards restraints which are primarily focused on labor mar-
kets, and where claims raised by employers are typically raised as claims regarding competition and 
business markets). 
 193. See supra pt. IV(A) and accompanying text. 
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in isolation, all anticompetitive activities would be subject to violation.194   
Looking at labor policy, however, it is clear that in labor markets, Con-
gress clearly wanted to promote collective bargaining to be beyond the 
reach of antitrust courts.195   
The inevitable collision of these two national policies resulted in the 
statutory and non-statutory exceptions. To reconcile these policies, one 
must read the laws together and understand that the antitrust and labor laws 
and policies create a continuum where antitrust and labor work together 
through the non-statutory labor exemption.196  Although the Supreme Court 
has been reserved in the amount of guidance to provide, Brown shows that 
the non-statutory exceptions clearly distinguish between business market 
anticompetitive activity and labor market anticompetitive activity.197  No-
tably, Clarett reads Brown and additional Second Circuit precedent to dic-
tate that the courts should defer to NLRB jurisdiction where the alleged 
restraint impacts the labor market and is a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining.198 
Where an allegation of antitrust violation is particularly focused on la-
bor concerns, the statutory labor exemptions (as defined inter alia by the 
Clayton Act) and non-statutory labor exemptions (as defined by Supreme 
Court precedent) dictate that jurisdiction belongs to the NLRB and not the 
antitrust courts.199  In employee raised situations, the employee is arguing 
that the impact is upon them as a labor supplier.  The consuming public 
may ultimately be impacted, but Congress has expressly (through national 
labor policy) stated its desire to remove these types of claims from antitrust 
charged courts and place it into the jurisdiction of labor law and the 
NLRB.200  As a result, Clarett recognized that Maurice Clarett’s claims 
involved a restraint which was brought to the court in the context of a labor 
  
 194. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (setting forth the policy goals of Sherman Act as prohibiting unreasonable 
anticompetitive restraints and failing to distinguish between anticompetitive behavior by consumers or 
suppliers). 
 195. Daniel H. Weintraub, 1994-1995 Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law: Labor Law: 
Collective Bargaining, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 303, 305-07 (1996). Further, the policy of labor law is to allow 
for workers and employers to be on equal bargaining strength to allow for the best possible labor terms.   
 196. See supra n. 178. 
 197. See Weiler & Roberts, supra n. 36, at 223-24 (noting that the Supreme Court has not issued a 
blanket antitrust exemption, but has looked into the affected markets impacted by the alleged anticom-
petitive impacts to determine if the exemption should apply); Weintraub, supra n. 195, at 305-07 (not-
ing Congress’ purpose in enacting the NLRA was to allow certain collective bargaining restraints to 
persist and even those that may impact business markets).   
 198. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143; see infra pt. (VI)(D) and accompanying text (discussing why Clarett 
was right in finding that the Eligibility Rules are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).  
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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market restraint, and properly ruled that the Eligibility Rules were ex-
empted because of the non-statutory labor exception.201 
Having determined which type of market the antitrust claim resides, 
the next step is to perform a detailed analysis of whether the non-statutory 
labor exemption applies.  Again, this note asserts that under Brown, a con-
tinuum exists between the Second and Eighth Circuit interpretations of the 
non-statutory labor exemption.202  For restraints primarily focused in labor 
markets, this note asserts that Clarett properly interprets Brown to recog-
nize a stronger deference to labor law.203  For restraints primarily focused 
in business markets, this note asserts that the underlying analysis set forth 
by Mackey, interpreting pre-Brown Supreme Court law, properly sets a 
standard that the exemption should apply for claims raised by parties to the 
restraint, where the restraint is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and the 
result of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.204  
B. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in the Labor Market 
Understanding that labor market restraints impact the relationship be-
tween labor and employers, the presence of a collective bargaining dictates 
that the alleged antitrust claim should be quashed for an adjudication by 
the NLRB under an unfair labor practice claim.  Clarett insightfully recog-
nizes that the non-statutory labor exemption waives antitrust liability for 
any “restraints on competition imposed through the collective bargaining 
process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a labor market char-
acterized by collective bargaining.”205  Brown set forth that the non-
statutory labor exemption applies to all mandatory subjects of bargaining 
(even a post-impasse salary restraint) where a CBA is present.  Here the 
question turns on whether player eligibility is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining.206 Clarett correctly finds that the Eligibility Rules were mandatory 
  
 201. Wood and progeny accurately foresaw the direction that the Supreme Court would take and did 
take in Brown. 
 202. Compare e.g. Jocelyn Sum, Clarett v. National Football League, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 807, 
808, 822-24 (2005) (averring that the Second Circuit law should be trumped for Eighth Circuit law) 
with e.g. supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (discussing how Clarett declined to follow or reject 
the Mackey factors, and instead set out its own interpretation because the factual situations between 
Clarett and Mackey differed). 
 203. See supra pt. V and accompanying text; see generally Clarett, 369 F.3d 134 (declining to reject 
Mackey, and instead noting that the Second Circuit and other Circuits have interpreted Brown and other 
Supreme Court precedent to recognize a stronger deference to labor law for restraints primarily focused 
in labor markets). 
 204. See supra pt. V and accompanying text; see generally Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613-16 (discussing 
Supreme Court precedent relied upon in determining the three pronged Mackey factors). 
 205. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (citing to Brown, 518 U.S. at 235). 
 206. See infra pt. VI(D) and accompanying text (discussing whether the Eligibility Rules are Manda-
tory Subject of Bargaining or Incorporated by Reference).  
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subjects of bargaining because of the immediate impact that draft eligibil-
ity has on the working conditions of current and future employees.207 
Commentators have questioned whether professional athletes deserve a 
different standard to determine whether player eligibility rules qualify as 
mandatory subjects of bargaining (noting that in traditional collective bar-
gaining wages are set by group and not made specific to certain employ-
ees).  All labor markets defined by collective bargaining are within the 
safeguard of the non-statutory exemption.208  To allow otherwise would 
jeopardize the balance between labor and antitrust law and would “subvert 
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.”209  Clarett further ex-
plained that the rights of individual players to negotiate specific salaries in 
no way demonstrated a departure from collective bargaining, and instead 
was an example of agreements made through that very process.210  There-
fore, Clarett was correct in finding that the Eligibility Rules were a part of 
the CBA because restraint directly influenced terms of initial employment, 
wages and working conditions, which are all mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining agreed to in the presence of the CBA. 
Where a CBA governs the relationship between employers and em-
ployees, increased deference is accorded to national labor policy for anti-
trust claims raised in labor markets (those raised by employees against 
their employers or their unions).  Accordingly, lessened deference is ac-
corded to national labor policy where the claims involve anticompetitive 
restraints which are raised in business markets (by competing employers 
against either the multi-employer bargaining unit or an alleged colluding 
union).  This lessened deference can be generally characterized by the 
relevant principles behind the Mackey factors; where the non-statutory 
labor exemption applies if the agreement involves mandatory subjects of 
negotiations, and where the agreement was reached through bona fide 
arm’s-length negotiations.211  
  
 207. See supra n. 70 and accompanying text; supra pt. III(C) and accompanying text (disussing the 
Second Circuit analysis of the Clarett case and finding that draft eligibility impact terms of initial 
employment, wages and working conditions). 
 208. Brown, 518 U.S. at 249.  “Petitioners also say that irrespective of how the labor exemption 
applies elsewhere to multiemployer collective bargaining, professional sports is ‘special.’  We can 
understand how professional sports may be special in terms of, say, interest, excitement, or concern.  
But we do not understand how they are special in respect to labor law's antitrust exemption.” Id. at 248. 
 209. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (citing to Wood, 809 F.2d at 959).  Notably, Brown, Clarett, and Wood 
do overrule or conflict with Supreme Court precedent set forth from Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Con-
nell.  Instead, Clarett and company provide further insight as to how the non-statutory labor exception 
is to be applied in cases raised by suppliers of labor whose antitrust allegations are restraints that pri-
marily operate in the labor market and not the business market.  
 210. Id. at 139 (discussing rationale from Caldwell as being permitted as a right derived from collec-
tive bargaining). 
 211. See supra pt. V(B)(1) and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit law from Mackey and 
Powell).  
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C.  Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in the Business Market 
Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Connell, all address multi-employer col-
lective bargaining situations where employers raised claims that union 
activity with other employers was anticompetitive.212  Employer-raised 
claims fall under business market analysis because the claim is that the 
CBA causes an injury to the employer’s business, which is to supply either 
goods or services to the consuming public.  There is a subtle reason for 
recognizing employer claims against fellow employers and/or unions.  In 
these situations employers compete with the other members of the multi-
employer bargaining unit and antitrust claims raised by these employers 
are typically related to marketing, competition in terms of product sales, 
and other business related concerns.213  These business market restraints 
restrict competition, directly impacting consumer prices. 
The business market restraint analysis applies the exemption only 
where the restraint impacts a party to the CBA and is the product of collec-
tive bargaining (being a mandatory subject of bargaining, agreed upon 
through bona fide arm’s-length negotiations).214  The Eighth Circuit, in 
Mackey, has properly interpreted these principles to interpret a three 
pronged test which can be applied to business market restraints. 
Under a Mackey type analysis, the first step is to determine whether 
Clarett is a party to the CBA; the answer is in the affirmative.  Clarett as a 
potential player, is a party to the CBA because he was attempting to offer 
his services under an employer-employee arrangement defined by the 
CBA.215  The real issue for Clarett’s claim (assuming an analysis based on 
business market) is whether the Eligibility Rules are a part of the CBA.216  
This can be resolved by determining whether the Eligibility Rules are 
mandatory subjects of bargaining217 or if they were the product of bona 
fide arm’s-length negotiations (being properly incorporated by reference 
into the CBA).218   
  
 212. See supra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text. 
 213. These concerns are arguably primarily related to restraints in the business market and not spe-
cifically related to restraints on the labor market (which typically include wage determination, em-
ployee eligibility and so forth). 
 214. See supra pt. IV(B) and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court precedent). 
 215. Itri, supra n. 13, at 331-32. 
 216. Effectively the purpose of the second and third prongs of the Mackey factors. 
 217. See supra pt. II(A) and accompanying text (discussing Haywood where the league declined to 
bring an argument that the non-statutory labor exemption applied due to collective bargaining).  Nota-
bly, in either labor market or business market, the dispositive issue is whether the Eligibility Rules 
were truly mandatory subjects of bargaining.  If yes, then the Eligibility Rules are a part of the CBA 
and shielded from antitrust analysis; if no, the Eligibility Rules would not be subject to non-statutory 
labor exception. 
 218. Worth mentioning is the fact that Brown specifically declined to mention the three pronged test 
laid out in Mackey.  The Supreme Court rather than endorse the Mackey factors, gave deference to 
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D. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining or Incorporated by Reference? 
The requirements of a mandatory subject of bargaining and whether 
the restraint was the product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations (by 
being incorporated by reference in the Clarett fact pattern) both address the 
same concept of whether the restraint is expressly or implicitly agreed to 
by the parties to the collective bargaining process.  Clarett properly an-
swers both of these concepts in the affirmative by noting that the Eligibility 
Rules were of such importance to the relationship between the union and 
the league that they were effectively incorporated into the CBA.  Manda-
tory subjects of bargaining are the conditions of employment which are 
mandatory and therefore key to the collective bargaining process.  Like-
wise, for a restraint to be the product of bona fide arms-length negotiations, 
the restraint must be agreed upon by the parties during the CBA process.  
Where a restraint is incorporated into the CBA by reference, it will be con-
sidered a product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations. 
Under both the labor market restraint analysis and the business market 
restraint analysis, the question to determine whether a restraint is a manda-
tory subject of bargaining is the same, whether the restraint involves the 
terms of initial employment, wages and working conditions, or immedi-
ately impacts these factors.  Where the restraint is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining and a CBA exists, Brown mandates that the CBA and non-
statutory labor exemption protect these mandatory subjects of bargaining 
from antitrust analysis.219  The arguments that the NFL Eligibility Rules 
are not mandatory either because the rules do not specifically fall into the 
“wages, hours, or terms of employment” language, or were not the product 
of express negotiations fails to convince.  Learned commentators have 
argued that the NFL Eligibility Rules are mandatory, “I have not talked to 
anybody who is a labor lawyer – who would agree that entry requirements 
are not a mandatory subject of bargaining.”220  Further, Clarett’s conclu-
sion that the NFL Eligibility Rules are a mandatory subject of bargaining 
due to the immediate impact they have on terms of employment is a better 
  
national labor law because the claim raised by Brown was a labor market restraint.  The Mackey fac-
tors, however, are still relevant law and have been followed in several jurisdictions.  This note endorses 
the principles set out by the Eighth Circuit but rather than following the specific three part test, prefers 
a more flexible analysis which looks to determine if the restraint was either a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, or a part of the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement. 
 219. See 518 U.S. at 250 (discussing why development squad salary restraints, albeit unilaterally 
imposed post impasse, are still terms which the parties to a collective bargaining process are required to 
negotiate even though they exist immediately after expiration of the CBA). 
 220. Jay Moyer, et al., Panel II:  Maurice Clarett’s Challenge, 15 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & 
Ent. L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (statement made by Professor Gary Roberts in answering whether he believed 
the Eligibility Rules were mandatory subjects of bargaining). 
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understanding of the principles behind national labor policy.221  As such, 
viewing the Eligibility Rules in either the labor or business market analy-
ses, they would likely stand.222 
Further, Clarett’s holding that the Eligibility Rules were mandatory 
subjects of bargaining were properly supported by its reading of Brown, 
which set forth a governing principle that in the presence of a collective 
bargaining situation, all mandatory subjects of bargaining (such as salary 
caps unilaterally imposed post impasse) were exempted from antitrust 
claims raised in predominant labor market settings.  By finding that the 
Eligibility Rules directly impacted employment conditions of potential 
players and current players (for example impacting veteran employment 
and overall player salaries from increased labor competition), Clarett 
deemed this restraint to be of equivalent importance as commonly recog-
nized mandatory subjects such as player salary. 
In determining whether the Eligibility Rules should be considered the 
product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations, if this restraint can be con-
sidered to have been incorporated by reference into the CBA, then the fact 
that the NFLPA and the NFLMC both agreed to terms and conditions of 
the CBA mandate that they are the product of bona fide arm’s-length nego-
tiations.  A court would be correct in determining that the Eligibility Rules 
were incorporated into the CBA because the NFL CBA expressly incorpo-
rated the NFL Constitution and By-laws.  Moreover, the current CBA was 
signed and renewed in a labor market where these rules pervaded.223 Like 
Brown, where the impasse was considered to be within the collective bar-
gaining process even though the CBA had expired,224 the court is required 
to see the collective bargaining process as a multifaceted practice that in-
cludes negotiating strategies, terms and tactics.  These tactics are often 
  
 221. Wherein national labor law promotes the collective bargaining process and attempts to provide 
labor with a more equal footing in negotiation power as compared to employers. 
 222. Having established that Clarett’s claim is within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, the next question 
is what would happen if the NLRB found that there was an unfair labor practice.  The NLRB could 
likely find (had Clarett continued to pursue his clause according to the decision as set forth by the 
Second Circuit) that the Eligibility Rules, as incorporated in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, were 
not properly bargained for and are outside of the collective bargaining process and agreement.  A 
finding by the NLRB that the Eligibility Rules are not part of the CBA could result in Clarett continu-
ing to bring his claim in the “antitrust” courts with the non-statutory labor exemption not applying. 
 223. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139-43.  Notably, commentators have posited that the unanimous opinion by 
the Second Circuit in Clarett incorrectly interpreted the NFL Eligibility Rules as mandatory subjects of 
bargaining.  See e.g. Gerba, supra n. 191, at 2414-17.  These commentators fail to appreciate the mean-
ing of the concept of “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” as described in the 
NLRB as described in First Natl. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981).  Clarett properly 
finds that the NFL Eligibility Rules are mandatory subjects of bargaining because it "[has] tangible 
effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL players."  Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140. 
 224. Since they were still in the process of negotiations, the NFL’s unilateral act was considered to be 
shielded from antitrust law. 
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beyond the ability of antitrust courts to comprehend without truly appreci-
ating the environment of the labor negotiations; a position that is best left 
for the NLRB.225  In light of this, the court would have to defer to basic 
freedom of contract principles and find that the union’s incorporation of 
the Eligibility Rules was a willing acquiescence.226  Therefore, the Eligibil-
ity Rules can be considered incorporated into the CBA by reference based 
on (1) the CBA’s express incorporation of the Constitution and By-Laws, 
and (2) the fact that NFLMC and the NFLPA had been operating under one 
form or another of the Eligibility Rules when the CBA was signed and 
later renewed. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit clearly points out the fact that the un-
ion had the ability to renegotiate the change to the terms of the Constitu-
tion and Bylaws made in 2000.227  Explaining that the option not to renego-
tiate could be considered to be a valid negotiation tactic, Clarett was right 
not to read the unions acquiescence of the change as failure of the collec-
tive bargaining process.228  Therefore, in addition to being mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining, the Eligibility Rules should be incorporated by refer-
ence. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In May of 2004, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Clarett 
v. National Football League. The court found that the antitrust non-
statutory labor exception applied to the NFL Eligibility Rules.  Clarett was 
subsequently unable to enter the 2004 draft.  The decision by the Second 
Circuit was a proper understanding of the law, but was based on a standard 
different from that pronounced by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. National 
Football League.  Relying on Brown, the Second Circuit clarified its long 
  
 225. See generally Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn., 532 
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (providing a judicial hands-off approach to claims which are found to be 
captured and addressed in alternative dispute resolutions as provided for by the industry’s collective 
bargaining agreement).  
 226. Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (finding a legal contract where an 
exchange of $25 for a debt of $2000 can be consideration because the amorphous value the offer may 
have for the acceptor).  Silence can be action sufficient to qualify as acceptance. Cole-McIntyre-
Norfleet Co. v. Holloway, 141 Tenn. 679 (1919) (articulating long held principle that a binding contract 
is formed if reasonable for the offeree to infer acceptance from the offeror’s silence and stating that a 
noisy and contested negotiation is not the only way for bargaining to occur). 
 227. See generally Roberts, supra n. 114, at 397-98, 403 (questioning Mackey’s rationale and appli-
cation regarding the inquiry into bona fide arm’s-length negotiations).  The suggestion that there were 
no explicit negotiations regarding the Eligibility Rules fails to equate to a negative finding regarding a 
bona-fide arm’s- length negotiation. 
 228. See e.g. id. at 396-97 (stating that courts should not substitute their judgment of fairness for what 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement may find to be legitimate). 
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held position interpreting national antitrust and labor law and policies and 
case precedent to require antitrust courts to defer to the jurisdiction of na-
tional labor policies and the NLRB when addressing restraints that exist in 
labor markets defined around collective bargaining. 
The non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law, considered by the 
Supreme Court to be an area of law to be populated more by confusion 
than clarity, is properly explained and applied by the Second Circuit.  
Clarett provides a sound explanation of the exemption and properly holds 
the NFL Eligibility Rules to be beyond the grasp of Maurice Clarett’s anti-
trust claims because of the non-statutory labor exemption.229  By interpret-
ing the guidelines from Brown and other Supreme Court precedent, a dual 
standard legal regime can exist where antitrust claims which are primarily 
focused on labor market are governed by Clarett (applying the non-
statutory labor exemption where the restraint relates to mandatory subject 
of bargaining) and where antitrust claims which are primarily focused on 
business markets are governed by the three pronged Mackey factors. This 
regime will prove to be a useful guide for business and labor of profes-
sional sports and other industries on how the non-statutory labor exemption 
should be applied. 
 
  
 229. Notably, after being a surprise third round draft pick in the 2005 NFL draft, Clarett participated 
in preseason practice before sustaining a groin injury which limited his ability to practice, resulting in 
his being released from the Broncos team roster on August 30, 2005. Associated Press, Shanahan, 
Broncos moving on after Clarett “mistake”, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2146319 
(updated Aug. 30, 2005); Associated Press, Clarett Cut Made Official as Broncos Release 14, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=2147226 (updated Aug. 30, 2005). 
